In this paper Hildebrand’s moral ontology is discussed. It is shown that his moral ontology is, in essence, Platonic rather than Aristotelian. Although Hildebrand’s language differs from that of Plato, the ideas are very similar, given that both are moral absolutists who think that moral eidê are ante rem rather than in re. They agree on the structure of the moral realm and have identical views on participation of the ideal in the real. They also have similar ideas on man’s (...) relationship towards the moral realm. (shrink)

In this paper Hildebrand’s moral ontology is discussed. It is shown that his moral ontology is, in essence, Platonic rather than Aristotelian. Although Hildebrand’s language differs from that of Plato, the ideas are very similar, given that both are moral absolutists who think that moral eidê are ante rem rather than in re. They agree on the structure of the moral realm and have identical views on participation of the ideal in the real. They also have similar ideas on man’s (...) relationship towards the moral realm. (shrink)

The Finalistic Difficulty in Freedom and Its Solution -- Chapter XVIII: Solution of the Ought-Antinomy -- The Inner Conflict in Free Will as the Moral Will -- Solution of the Conflict. Exposure of Equivocations -- The Conflict of the Two Factors in Moral Freedom -- The Complementary Relation behind the Apparent Conflict -- The Recurrence of "Negative Freedom" in the Ought-Antinomy -- The Scope of " Negative" Freedom and its True Relation to " Positive" Freedom -- Reciprocal Conditionality of Positive (...) and Negative Freedom with Regard to Values -- Two-sided Freedom in the Self-Determination of the Person -- Chapter XIX: Problems Still Unsolved -- The Difficulty Concerning Individuality in Moral Freedom -- The Positive Relation between Universal and Individual Autonomy -- The Question as to the Nature of the Individual Determinant -- Personal Teleology as a Determinational Mode of Positive Freedom -- The Ontological Difficulty in Personal Freedom -- The Categorial Structure of the Complex Conditioning-Relationship -- Moral and Categorial Freedom -- The Limit to the Problem -- Section VI: Appendix to the Doctrine of Freedom -- Chapter XX: Apparent and Real Defects of the Theory -- Chapter XXI: Ethical and Religious Freedom -- Index. (shrink)

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann. Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato. In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by (...) Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is "value." Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them. The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the "ought." Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann, along with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, was instrumental in restoring metaphysics to the study of philosophy. Unlike his contemporaries, however, Hartmann was clearly influenced by Plato. His tour-de-force, Ethik, published in English in 1932 as Ethics, may be the most outstanding work on moral philosophy produced in the twentieth century. In the first part of Ethics, Hartmann was concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena, and criticized utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. In the second part, (...) Moral Values, the author describes all values as forming a complex and as yet imperfectly known system. The actualization of the non-moral and elementary moral values is a necessary condition for the actualization of the higher values. It is on this account that rudimentary values have a prior claim. Hartmann outlines the main features of the chief virtues, and shows that the moral disposition required in any exigency is always a specific synthesis of various and often conflicting values. Specifically describing fundamental moral values-such as goodness, nobility, and vitality-and special moral values-such as justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, trustworthiness, and modesty-Hartmann takes theoretical philosophy and brings it very much into the realm of the practical. A compelling and insightful volume, Moral Values remains an essential contribution to the moral and ethical literature of the twentieth century. Hartmann offers a self-contained system of ethics that yet offers a conservative outlook on social life. (shrink)